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 Abstract 
 
 In this paper I assemble and array two rarely used data sets to measure the extent of 
aggregate concentration -- the share of national economic activity accounted for by the largest X 
companies -- in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s.  The data show clearly that, despite the substantial 
merger wave of the 1980s and the far larger wave of the 1990s, aggregate concentration declined in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s.  Aggregate concentration increased after the mid 1990s, but the 
levels at the end of the decade were still at or below the levels of the late 1980s or early 1990s.  The 
average size of firm did increase, however, and the relative importance of the larger size classes of 
firms increased generally.  Gini coefficients computed for employment shares and payroll shares of 
companies showed moderate but steady increases from 1988 through 1998.  In the conclusion of the 
paper I offer some tentative hypotheses for explaining these patterns. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
 Whenever the U.S. economy experiences a major wave of large mergers, as it clearly did in 
the 1990s and to a lesser extent in the 1980s, a natural question to consider is the structural 
consequences for the U.S. economy:  Are the mergers significantly changing the size-distribution of 
large firms and thereby causing the largest firms in the economy to grow relative to the overall size 
of the economy?  And if that were so and if the effects were persistent, is this a matter of economic 
or social concern?  Might we soon arrive at the outcome suggested by the title of a 1976 New York 
magazine article (Tobias 1976): "March 3, 1998: The Day They Couldn't Fill the FORTUNE 500"? 
 This article will address these questions, employing two rarely used data sets for the 1980s 
and 1990s.  As a shorthand, the share of some national economic aggregate that is accounted for by 
the largest X firms in the economy is frequently described as a measure of "aggregate 
concentration".1  Thus, this article will be about aggregate concentration in the U.S. in the 1980s 
and 1990s.2 
                                                           
    1 As will be discussed below, the measurement of aggregate concentration, as well the questions 
that the measurement addresses, are separate and separable from the more familiar issues and 
measurement concerning seller concentration and the exercise of market power in specific markets. 
    2 Summaries of measurements for earlier periods can be found in Scherer (1970, 1980), White 
(1981), Golbe and White (1988), and Scherer and Ross (1990); see also Pryor (forthcoming (b)).  
Among the earliest efforts to measure aggregate concentration was that of Berle and Means (1932), 
who measured the share of all non-financial firms' assets that were accounted for by the largest 200 
companies, for the years 1909 through 1929.  It is noteworthy that Berle and Means made their 
measurements shortly after the merger wave of the 1920s and that Scherer (1970) extensively 
reviewed the extant studies shortly after the merger wave of the 1960s. 
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 To help guide the discussion that follows, I will preview my findings:  The data show 
clearly an strongly that -- despite the recent wave of mergers -- aggregate concentration declined 
during the 1980s and early 1990s and then generally increased after the mid 1990s, but the levels at 
the end of the decade remained at or below the levels of the late 1980s or early 1990s.  However, 
the average size of firm increased steadily from 1988 onward, as did the relative importance of the 
larger size classes of firms (even though the shares of the giants have not increased), and the size 
distribution of firms became slightly more skewed toward larger firms. 
 In the conclusion I will offer some tentative hypotheses to explain these patterns. 
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 II. The Merger Wave 
 
 Though the merger wave of the 1980s and 1990s is not the focus of this article,3 a brief 
presentation of those data will be worthwhile, to set the stage. 
 Annual data on economy-wide mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can be found in two 
sources: Mergerstat Review, and Mergers & Acquisitions magazine.  Both sources track "large" 
(based on purchase price) M&As, compiled from business and financial news reports; the merger of 
Nora's Coffee Shop with Joe's Gasoline Station ("Eat Here and Get Gas!") will not be included in 
either data set.4  Both sources offer data on the annual number of M&As and on the annual value -- 
aggregated purchase prices -- of the M&As.  For both sources the value series is even less complete 
than the numbers series, because some acquisitions -- involving companies that are not publicly 
traded -- may not yield publicly disclosed terms of the transaction; because these non-public 
transactions tend to be the smaller ones, however, this incompleteness is not as serious as it might 
otherwise seem to be. 
 Figure 1 shows the estimates of the annual number of large M&As from both sources of 
data; Figure 2 shows the annual M&A value data.  The data for the annual number of large mergers 
in Figure 1 show a clear wave in the 1990s that peaked in 1999 or 2000;5 the Mergers & 
Acquisitions data also show a smaller rise in the 1980s, while the Mergerstat data show no such rise 
in the 1980s but show that the merger wave of the late 1960s and early 1970s was numerically 
                                                           
    3 For a discussion of the current wave, see Black (2000) and Pryor(forthcoming (a)); for 
discussions of waves up to the early 1980s, see Golbe and White (1988; 1993). 
    4 See the appendix for a discussion of the two sources' size criteria. 
    5 Preliminary data for 2001 indicate that merger activity will be substantially reduced for this 
year. 
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substantial.6 
 The data from both sources are more consistent for the annual value-of-mergers series in 
Figure 2:  There was a modest wave in the mid 1980s that peaked in the late 1980s and then a far 
more sizable wave that began in the early 1990s. 
 Some deflating of these data is warranted, however, because the U.S. economy grew 
substantially in nominal and real terms during the four decades covered by the data.  There are two 
candidates for deflating the annual numbers of mergers: annual real GDP, since the economy was 
growing and transactions of all kinds could be expected to increase as well; and the annual 
aggregate number of corporations in the economy, since the large companies that are buying and 
being bought in these M&A series are overwhelmingly corporations.7  For the annual value of 
M&As, there are three candidates for deflation: just the annual GDP deflator, to correct for the 
general increase in prices in the U.S. economy; annual nominal GDP, to correct for inflation and the 
larger real economy over time; and an annual measure of the aggregate value of all publicly traded 
corporations,8 since these values are the base from which successful M&A transactions must be 
negotiated. 
 Figures 3 and 4 show the deflated M&A numbers series (converted to index numbers, with 
1980 = 100); Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the deflated M&A value series (again converted to index 
numbers with 1980 = 100).  The Figures 3 - 6 tell the same fundamental story as the undeflated 
Figures 1 - 2.  Figure 7, however, which deflates the merger value series by the aggregate market 
                                                           
    6 Part of this earlier importance may be an illusion, however, since, as is described in the 
Appendix, Mergerstat used lower minimum size criteria for the inclusion of transactions in its 
M&A series prior to 1989. 
    7 In the calculations described below, we subtract the small "S" corporations from the annual 
aggregate number of corporations. 
    8 The data from the Federal Reserve's "flow of funds" tabulations are used. 
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value of traded companies, shows that by this measure the merger wave of the 1990s was no bigger 
than the wave of the 1980s.9 
 In any event, regardless of series used, whether deflated or not, the data indicate that the 
U.S. economy experienced a modest merger wave during the 1980s and another wave in the 1990s 
that, except when merger values are deflated by aggregate stock market value, was far more 
substantial.  
                                                           
    9 There is, however, a causality issue:  Were the market values of traded companies inflated by 
expectations of takeovers? 
  
 
6
 III. Measuring Aggregate Concentration: Why, How, and Earlier Estimates 
 
A. Why measure aggregate concentration? 
 The political/social concerns about the economic, political, and social power that might be a 
consequence of the presence and relative growth of large companies in the U.S. economy have a 
long history.  They extend back at least to the populist movement of the late nineteenth century and 
arguably back even to Jefferson's support for and concerns about yeomen farmers. 
 One manifestation of the populist concern about the economic power of large companies 
was the U.S. antitrust laws, notably the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.  The populist concern about the wider social/political 
influence and power of large and growing companies found no similar specific national legislative 
expression in the nineteenth century.  One state-level manifestation, however, was the universal 
prohibition by the states on interstate branching by banks and the limitations by most states on 
intra-state banking.  Many states, especially those that were heavily agricultural, even limited their 
banks to a single location ("unit banking").  The intent clearly was that banks should be kept small 
and locally focused.10 
 The populist concern about the growth of large corporations and the concomitant decrease 
in the relative importance of small enterprises finally found its national expression in the New Deal 
legislation of the 1930s, following the stock market crash of 1929-1933 and the onset of the Great 
Depression.  The manifestations were primarily in measures to aid and preserve small enterprises.  
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 had this intent, with the National Recovery 
Administration (NRA) subsequently permitting nearly a thousand industry groups to develop 
"codes of fair competition" that were intended to discourage price cutting and other aggressive 
                                                           
    10 For further discussions, see White (1993, 1995). 
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behaviors so that smaller enterprises could survive alongside larger ones.  The Robinson-Patman 
Act of 1936 amended the Clayton Act to strengthen its prohibitions on price discrimination, with 
the intention of helping small businesses, especially small retailers, by preventing their larger rivals 
from receiving lower prices from suppliers.  The Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act of 
1937, which permitted the states to authorize resale price maintenance ("fair trade"), was 
championed by small retailers (especially pharmacists) that wished to limit the price cutting of their 
larger (chain-store) rivals.  Even the Agricultural Adjustment Acts (AAA) of 1933 and 1936 had 
the preservation of small ("family") farms as a major goal. 
 After World War II the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 established the Small Business 
Administration, as an agency to aid and encourage small businesses, and various legislative acts, 
such as authorizations for Defense Department procurement, included "set-asides" for small 
businesses.  Periodic legislative acts to support U.S. agriculture have had the continued goal of 
supporting the (small) family farm. 
 It is clear, then, that the political/social concerns about the absolute and relative sizes of 
businesses in the U.S. economy have a long history.  Though their recent manifestations have 
primarily focused on concerns about small businesses, the concern about large companies has also 
been present.  In the late 1970s, for example, as political concerns about a new wave of mergers 
heightened, legislation that would have limited mergers by large firms was seriously considered by 
the Congress before being dropped.  And in the Riegle-Neale Interstate Branching Act of 1994, 
which finally provided federal endorsement for interstate branching, there nevertheless were (and 
still are) ceilings on the fraction of a state's bank deposits that any single bank could account for. 
 Even aside from any populist feelings that might trigger concerns about large companies, it 
seems clear that the feel and fabric of an economy where, say, only 100 companies -- or even 1,000 
-- accounted for all or virtually all of economic activity would be quite different from one in which 
economic activity was substantially more widely dispersed.  These differences need not be the 
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consequence of the exercise of market power by the large companies in individual markets.  After 
all, if all 100 of these companies had roughly equal presences in all relevant markets, the measured 
levels of seller concentrations in those markets would easily satisfy the structural pre-conditions for 
perfect or near-perfect competition.11  Nevertheless, with, say, only 100 companies accounting for 
virtually all of private sector GDP, the average number of employees per company would be 
approximately one million, and the average value added per company would be $80 billion.  The 
landscape for employment opportunities or for the funding of new ideas, for example, would be 
quite different from that found in a less concentrated economy.  Even if there were 1,000 economy-
wide companies and the per-company magnitudes were only a tenth as large as just mentioned, we 
would still be describing a very different landscape than (as we will demonstrate) is present in 
today's U.S. economy. 
 Further, even if one were unsure whether aggregate concentration could be a problem (and 
if so, at which levels), nevertheless information about changes in aggregate concentration level 
could be useful, especially if they were to show no change or a decrease (thus indicating that, even 
if one believed that there might be a problem, it wasn't getting any worse). 
 
B. How to measure aggregate concentration 
 If one is concerned about the relative share of economic activity of large companies, then 
surely the aggregated value added of the companies is the best all-around measure.  A further 
advantage is that value added is unambiguously comparable across all firms, regardless of the 
nature of their business. 
 Some other candidate measures -- employment, aggregate wages or payroll, or profits -- are 
                                                           
    11 The huge number of multi-market contacts that this structure would imply might weaken 
substantially the competitive behavior that the individual market seller concentrations would 
otherwise imply.  For discussions of the potential and actual influence of multi-market contacts, see 
Feinberg (1985), Rhoades and Heggestad (1985), and Bernheim and Whinston (1990). 
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simply components (directly or indirectly12) of value added.13  Another candidate measure, 
aggregate sales revenue (which was popularized by its use as the criteria for specifying Fortune 
magazine's "Fortune 500"), presents obvious problems of double-counting and the related problem 
of a sales measure's exclusion of the extent of vertical integration of the enterprise; thus, vertical 
mergers would yield little or no apparent increase in sales and therefore no change in relative 
importance of the merged entity, despite its expanded economic activity.14 
 Further, the "sales revenue" concept for financial institutions is less well defined.  Should 
the concept include the securities sales of a brokerage firm on behalf of its customers?  Should the 
concept include the firm's securities sales from its own portfolio?  Both?  Neither?  In practice, 
neither category is reported as sales revenue.  Instead, financial firms register as revenue their 
interest and fee income plus any gains from their trading operations.  This revenue concept seems 
appropriate for comparisons with a non-financial firm.  But the employees of financial firms 
primarily think of the sizes of their companies in terms of assets -- which brings us to another 
candidate measure. 
 A firm's assets15 as the basis for an aggregate concentration measurement presents at least 
                                                           
    12 I.e., employment is an indirect component, since it is employment multiplied by the 
compensation per worker that yields aggregate labor income, which is a direct component of value 
added. 
    13 Also, a company's reported pre-tax profits can be affected by the vagaries of allowed 
depreciation and amortization rates -- which can vary across firms depending on the types of assets 
in which they have invested -- and its post-tax profits can be further affected by corporate tax rates 
(which again can vary across firms depending on tax brackets and any special provisions in the tax 
code). 
    14 Retail firms with relatively thin value-added margins would be over-represented by a sales-
based measure; "upstream" firms with greater value-added relative to sales would be under-
represented. 
    15 Like employment, assets would be an indirect component of a firm's value added; when 
multiplied by the profit rate on those assets, the firm's profits -- a direct component of value added -
- would be obtained. 
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three problems:  First, if financial intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual 
funds are included, there is substantial double-counting, since the assets of these intermediaries 
largely consist of the liabilities of the enterprises to which they have lent or in which they have 
invested, with those liabilities in turn having been used to fund the assets of those enterprises. 
 Second, the presence of two alternative accounting treatments for M&As can mean 
substantially different levels of assets that would appear on an acquiring company's balance sheet, 
solely because of the acquirer's choice of accounting treatment.  Pooling, where the assets of the 
acquired company are simply transferred to the acquiring company's balance sheet at their pre-
merger balance-sheet values, would mean relatively lower post-merger asset values; purchase 
accounting, where an additional goodwill asset is created and entered on the acquiring company's 
balance sheet, to reflect the difference between the purchase price and the pre-merger net asset 
(balance-sheet) value of the acquired company, would mean relatively higher post-merger asset 
values.  Thus, reported asset values could vary substantially, depending on which accounting 
treatment was chosen in for otherwise identical mergers. 
 Third, changes over time in accounting and tax treatment of asset depreciation, 
amortization, and write-offs, as well as changes in the expensing-versus-writeoff treatment of 
various categories of costs, could arbitrarily affect reported asset values. 
 Despite value added's superiority as an all-around measure of relative importance, one 
offsetting argument should be entered.  The political process does place a great deal of emphasis on 
employment -- "jobs" and job creation and losses -- as well as on wage income.  Accordingly, a 
focus on the employment share and on the aggregate wages (payroll) share of large companies may 
well be an appropriate runner-up measure to value added. 
 
C. Actual measures. 
 Unfortunately, despite the superiority of value added for measuring large companies' 
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relative importance, value-added data are not widely collected on a systematic basis at the company 
level.  The only exception is the Census Bureau's Census of Manufactures' reporting of the relative 
value added of the 50, 100, 150, and 200 largest manufacturing companies (against the base of all 
manufacturing enterprises) for the economic census years beginning in 1947 and continuing 
through the most recently available census, 1997.16  But manufacturing, of course, has never 
constituted the entire private sector or even as much as a third of the private sector, and its relative 
importance has declined over these 50 years.17  Consequently, these value added data for 
manufacturing, though correct in intent and concept, are sorely incomplete as an economy-wide 
measure of aggregate concentration. 
 In the absence of company-level value-added data for anything beyond manufacturing, 
efforts to measure aggregate concentration have focused on employment, profits, and non-financial 
firms' assets.  Employment and profits data have been drawn from the Fortune lists.  The "Fortune 
500" lists, first published in 1955 (covering firms' 1954 data), were based on sales rankings and 
initially included only "industrial" (i.e., manufacturing and mining) companies.18  However, their 
reach was expanded sufficiently in the early 1970s so that economy-wide aggregate concentration 
measures of employment and profits could be compiled for the 1970s on a reasonably consistent 
year-to-year basis (White 1981).  A drawback, however, was that the company data for employment 
and after-tax profits reported by Fortune were based on consolidated company reports and thus 
                                                           
    16 The economic census years have been 1947, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992, and 1997.  In addition, value-added aggregate concentration measures were offered in the 
Census Bureau's Annual Survey of Manufactures for the years 1962, 1966, 1970, and 1976. 
    17 In 1947 manufacturing constituted 30.8% of U.S. private-sector GDP.  It hit a post-war 
percentage high in 1955, at 33.1% (just shy of a third), and has been declining (relatively) ever 
since.  In 1999 the manufacturing sector constituted 20.5% of non-governmental GDP. 
    18 This restriction meant that large utilities, including AT&T, banks, insurance companies, 
railroads and airlines, and service companies were excluded from the lists. 
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included their non-U.S. operations.  Accordingly, the aggregate concentration measure -- the 
fraction of U.S. private sector employment (or profits) that was accounted for by the largest X 
companies -- involved a numerator that included some non-U.S. employment (or profits); and, so 
long as the large firms were expanding their non-U.S. operations at a different rate than their U.S. 
activities, year-to-year comparisons were subject to error.19  Also, the after-tax profit data were 
subject to the vagaries noted above.  Finally, Fortune changed its coverage sufficiently in the early 
1980s so that measurements for these years were not comparable with the measurements of the 
1970s. 
 Data for the 50, 100, 150, and 200 largest non-financial companies' assets were compiled by 
the Federal Trade Commission and were available from 1958 to 1988.  But, by excluding financial 
firms they were necessarily incomplete, as well as embodying the other drawbacks of assets 
measures. 
 
C. What did the earlier measurements indicate? 
 The data just described clearly had substantial imperfections.  Still, even with those 
imperfections, what did the data indicate as to the levels and changes in aggregate concentration? 
 The cleanest data, as well as longest comparable series, has been the Bureau of the Census' 
value-added data for manufacturing for the economic census years (plus a few additional years) 
between 1947 and 1997.  These data are presented in Table 1.  As is indicated, they show a rise in 
manufacturing aggregate concentration between 1947 and 1954, a far more gradual rise for the next 
three decades, and then a decline in the 1990s.  By 1997 the manufacturing aggregate concentration 
                                                           
    19 Also, the Fortune lists exclude non-U.S. firms that have U.S. operations.  Though less serious 
in the 1970s and before, this became a more serious issue in the 1980s and 1990s; for example, 
when Daimler absorbed Chrysler in 1998, Chrysler disappeared from the Fortune list, while 
Daimler-Chrysler (because it is not headquartered in the U.S.) did not replace Chrysler on the list.  
The same phenomenon occurred when BP absorbed Amoco in 1998. 
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levels were at the levels of 1963.  But, of course, manufacturing was only a fraction of the overall 
private sector -- 30.8% of private-sector GDP in 1947, rising to a peak of 33.1% in 1955, and 
falling to 20.5% in 1999. 
 The next longest data series was the FTC's non-financial corporations' assets.20  As shown 
in Table 2, these data indicate a modest decline in aggregate concentration between the late 1950s 
and the late 1970s and then a steeper decline in the 1980s. 
 Finally for more comprehensive (but shorter) economy-wide data (drawn from economy-
wide Fortune lists) White (1981) showed that during the 1970s aggregate concentration -- based on 
both employment and corporate profits -- was relatively unchanged or may have declined modestly. 
 These data are shown in Table 3. 
 In sum, the limited data previously collected indicates no net change in aggregate 
concentration (measured by value added) in manufacturing since the early 1960s, a decline in 
aggregate concentration (measured by assets) in the non-financial sector between the late 1950s and 
the late 1980s, and stability or a modest decline in economy-wide aggregate concentration (as 
measured by employment and by profits) in the 1970s. 
                                                           
    20 This series has been cited and described by Golbe and White (1988), Ginsberg (1986), and 
Yellen (1998). 
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 IV. Aggregate Concentration in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
 With this background we can now discuss and present the new data that were gathered 
specially for this paper.  First, though, let us dispel any lingering doubts as to whether somehow the 
U.S. economy has reached a skewed structural level approximating that 1976 New York magazine 
article's title.  The 2001 Fortune list (covering data for the 1,000 largest companies across all sectors 
of the U.S. economy for 2000, ranked by sales revenue) had no trouble finding 1,000 large 
companies to fill out its list;21 the 1,000th company was the Amica Mutual Insurance Company, 
with revenues in 2000 of $1.2 billion, $3.0 billion in assets, and 3,316 employees. (The largest 
company by revenue size was Exxon Mobil, with $210.4 billion in revenue; the largest company by 
assets was Citigroup, which had $902.2 billion in assets.) 
 More generally, the U.S. in 2000 had 5.5 million corporations, 2.0 million partnerships, and 
an estimated 17.7 million non-farm sole proprietorships.22  These numbers were up from 1980 
numbers of 2.7 million corporations, 1.4 million partnerships, and 9.7 million non-farm sole 
proprietorships.23  An expanding U.S. economy continues to be populated by an ever-rising number 
of enterprises of all kinds. 
                                                           
    21 To be fair, the 1976 article (with tongue in cheek) did not quite predict that there would be 
fewer than 500 firms in total in the U.S. economy in 1998.  "There were more than 479 companies 
in the world [in 1997]...  There were still tens of thousands of firms that ranged from one-man 
shops up to what once would have been considered a fairly good-sized company.  But the gap 
between these and the 479 giants was enormous.  It would have looked silly to put even a company 
with $248 million in assets on the list, when the next largest ... -- number 479 -- had assets of nearly 
$7 billion" (Tobias 1976). 
    22 These data are derived from IRS Statistics of Income data; the 2000 non-farm sole 
proprietorship number was extrapolated from the actual 1998 and 1999 data.  In addition, there 
were 1.8 million farm sole proprietorships in 2000. 
    23 There were also 2.5 million farm sole proprietorships in 1980. 
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 We now turn to our new data.  Our data come from two sources: a relatively new annual 
data series encompassing employment and aggregate wages (payroll), which has been compiled by 
the Bureau of the Census; and the longer-standing annual "500" lists that have been compiled by 
Forbes magazine.  We will discuss each in turn. 
 
A. The Bureau of the Census employment and payroll data. 
 The Bureau of the Census has developed a publicly available annual series, "Statistics of 
U.S. Business", that enumerates the numbers of firms, numbers of establishments,  employment, 
payroll, and sales receipts, drawn from company-level information on companies' U.S. operations.  
The data cover nearly all of the private-sector economy and are disaggregated into major one-digit 
SIC (through 1997) or two-digit NAICS (beginning in 1998) sectors.  The series currently covers 
the years 1988-1998 (with 1999 to be released before the end of 2001).  Most important for our 
purposes, the data are grouped into company-size categories based on a company's number of 
employees.  Thus, there are company (employee) size categories of 0-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-99, 100-499, 
and 500-and-above employees.  For some years the size categories are finer, and for 1992 and 1998 
the economy-wide employee size categories also extend to 550-999, 1,000-1,4999, 1,500-2,499, 
2,500-4,999, 5,000-9,999, and 10,000-and-above employees.24 
 At this author's request the Bureau of the Census compiled the data for the numbers of 
firms, employment, and payroll for all years (i.e., 1988 - 1998) and for all of the coarse sectors into 
the complete range of employee size categories that extend to 10,000-and-above employees; in 
addition, the Bureau of the Census specially compiled the employment and payroll aggregates for 
the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 economy-wide companies, for each year. 
                                                           
    24 These data can be found at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html and at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/data.html.  The data are described at greater length in Armington 
(1998), Robb (1999, 2000), and Kwoka and White (2001). 
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 Unfortunately, the data are not perfect.  First, they cover only eleven years.  Second, they 
cover only employment and payroll, not value added.  Third, their coverage is not quite complete.  
They exclude the self-employed;25 farms; railroads; the U.S. Postal Service; households (e.g., as 
employers of domestic workers); and large pension, health, and welfare funds.  They do, however, 
include non-profit enterprises generally. 
 Despite these drawbacks, the data are more comprehensive than most other measures, they 
are consistent from year to year, and they exclude non-U.S. operations while including the U.S. 
operations of non-U.S. companies.26  Also, these are the first-ever data to allow payroll information 
to be used for economy-wide aggregate concentration measurements.  These are large pluses for a 
data set in an area that is as plagued by poor data as is the area of aggregate concentration. 
 Table 4 shows the total number of companies, their total employment and payroll, and their 
average employment and payroll size for 1988-1998.  As can be seen, the total number of 
companies and their employment and payrolls grew over these eleven years.  The average 
employment size of companies grew; their average payroll grew even faster (as would be expected 
in an era of rising wages). 
 Table 5 shows the economy-wide aggregate concentration measures of employment and of 
payroll for the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 U.S. companies and for all U.S. companies with 10,000 
or more employees for the years 1988-1998.  For the employment measure (Panel A), aggregate 
concentration for the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 companies clearly declined through 1995 and then 
                                                           
    25 The Bureau of the Census describes the coverage as encompassing "employer firms".  For 
1998 the Census Bureau lists 5,579,177 "employer firms" that had 108,117,731 employees.  It lists 
15,708,727 "nonemployer firms".  Many of these latter enterprises represent part-time efforts by 
individuals who have full-time employment elsewhere, in an "employer firm", so the full-time 
equivalent employment of these "non-employer firms" is substantially smaller than their aggregate 
number indicates. 
    26 This restriction limits the non-U.S. company's apparent importance.  But, short of compiling a 
global aggregate concentration measure, there is no satisfactory way of handling this issue. 
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rose, so that by 1998 their levels were approaching or were at those of the late 1980s. 
 For the payroll measure (Panel B of Table 5), the decline in aggregate concentration through 
the middle 1990s was more pronounced than was true for the employment measure.  Despite some 
increases after 1995 or 1996, aggregate concentration levels in 1998 were lower than they had been 
in 1988 for the 100, 500, and 1,000 largest companies. 
 The data from Table 5, then, are clear:  Economy-wide aggregate concentration levels for 
the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 companies, whether measured by employment or by payroll, 
declined from 1988 through the mid 1990s and then rose, but by 1998 they were either still below 
or just equal to their 1988 levels. 
 Another feature of the employment data is worth noting.  Kwoka and White (2001) found 
that the fraction of employment accounted for by "small firms" -- firms with fewer than 100 
employees or fewer than 500 employees -- declined between 1988 and 1996.  These data are 
reproduced and updated in Table 6, and the payroll data are added as well; the decline also 
encompassed payroll shares and continued in 1997 and 1998.  Since the smallest firms were losing 
their employment shares, while the largest 100, 500, and 1,000 companies were either losing 
employment shares or just keeping pace, the necessary implication is that the firms in between -- 
firms that were larger than the smallest firms but smaller than the giants27 -- were the net gainers. 
 Tables 7 and 8 shed further light on these size distribution questions.  Panel A of Table 7 
shows the aggregate numbers of companies in the various size classes; all size classes showed 
absolute growth in the numbers of companies throughout the period.  Panel B shows their relative 
distribution.  The smaller size classes tended to be relatively stable or to decline slightly; the larger 
size classes (100-499 employees, and larger) tended to grow in relative numbers. 
 The size classes' shares of employment and payroll are shown in Table 8.  Panel A shows 
                                                           
    27 In 1998 the 100 largest companies averaged 116,705 employees; the largest 500 averaged 
43,438 employees; and the largest 1,000 companies averaged 29,268 employees. 
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that the smaller size classes -- those at or below 20-99 employees -- experienced declines in their 
shares of employment of the 1988-1998 period.  The 100-499 employee size class was relatively 
stable over these years. The next larger size classes -- those between 500-999 employees and 2,500-
4,999 employees -- experienced a rise in employment shares through the mid 1990s and then a 
modest decline.  Finally, the largest size classes -- 5,000-9,999 employees and 10,000+ employees -
- showed a modest rise through the mid 1990s and then a sharper rise in the late 1990s. 
 Panel B of Table 8 shows the payroll shares.  The pattern for payroll shares is similar to that 
of employment shares, except that the payroll share of the largest size group declined through the 
mid 1990s before rising in 1998 to a level that was only slightly higher than that of 1988. 
 These employment and payroll share patterns raise the possibility of something more than 
just the increases in the average employee size and payroll size of companies shown in Table 4.  
The size distribution of companies may have become more skewed toward larger firms, despite the 
decline or stability of aggregate concentration among the giants shown in Table 6.  One way of 
investigating this possibility is to compute Gini coefficients for cumulative employment shares 
relative to cumulative company size shares and for cumulative payroll shares relative to cumulative 
company size shares.28  These are shown in Table 9.  They indicate a small but steady growth of 
                                                           
    28 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of the distribution of some variable across a 
population.  It is the following ratio: the area between the Lorenz curve (which plots the cumulative 
fractional share of the variable against the cumulative fractional share of the population) and the 
diagonal (which represents perfect equality of distribution of the variable), divided by the area of 
the triangle beneath the diagonal (which is 0.5).  A Gini coefficient takes the value 0.0 for complete 
equality across the population and 1.0 for complete inequality (i.e., n-1 members of the population 
have nothing, and the nth member has the entire amount).  For the size category data that are 
available in Tables 6 and 7, the Gini coefficient is calculated as follows: 
            m-1 
   G = Σ (FiHi+1 - Fi+1Hi), 
            i=1 
where Fi represents the cumulative population (i.e., company) share and Hi represents the 
cumulative employment (or payroll) share for size category i among the m (=11) size categories. 
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Gini coefficients for both categories.29  Thus, despite the decline or stability of the economy-wide 
aggregate concentration measures, there was a mild tendency for the firms in the larger size 
categories in the economy (though not the giants) to be growing relatively more important. 
 The data in Tables 10 and 11 provide further information on how the trends in the major 
sectors may have been affecting the economy-wide trends, by examining the employment and 
payroll shares for companies with 10,000-and-above employees.  These sectoral data are not 
additively comparable to the economy-wide data, because a company with 10,000-and-above 
economy-wide employees might show up in none, one, or more than one of the sectors of Tables 10 
and 11, depending on that company's employee distribution across sectors.  Nevertheless, the tables 
provide a sense of the underlying trends within these sectors, at least through 1997 (since the 1998 
change in classification system makes comparisons more problematic for some sectors).  As can be 
seen, the employment shares of the 10,000-and-above companies fell in mining, construction, 
manufacturing, and transportation-communications-utilities.  They rose in the remaining sectors.  
The same pattern held for payroll shares, except that they fell for wholesaling as well.  The 
changing relative employment weights for these sectors are provided at the bottom of the tables.  
Manufacturing had the largest percentage fall in its employment weight, while services had the 
largest increase in its weight.  These changing sector weights also contributed to the economy-wide 
outcomes of Tables 10 and 11. 
 Finally, there is another point -- somewhat off the track of aggregate concentration 
measurements, but nevertheless noteworthy -- that relates to the relationship between the 
employment data and the payroll data for the giants in Table 5.  Traditionally, larger firms have paid 
their employees higher wages than has been the case for smaller firms.  The reasons for this have 
                                                           
    29 As a rough numbers equivalent, if there were only two size categories of companies and 91% 
of the firms accounted for 9% of employment while the remaining 9% of the firms accounted for 
the remaining 91% of employment, this would yield a Gini coefficient of 0.82.   A Gini coefficient 
of 0.84 would be yielded by a similar 92%-8% split between the two categories. 
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been an amalgam of greater tendencies to be unionized, to employ employees with higher levels of 
human capital (partly as a consequence of the greater unionization), and to be more inclined to pay 
above-market "efficiency" wages, so as to compensate for the decreased monitoring of individual 
employees that accompanies larger size.  These higher relative wages by large companies can be 
seen in the comparisons of the aggregate concentration percentages in the early years of the data in 
Table 5:  The giant firms' share of payroll was larger than their share of employment.30 
 Over time, however, this differential narrowed considerably.  Lower levels of and weaker 
unionization among larger firms was surely part of the explanation for this change.  Whether 
changes in relative levels of human capital and of monitoring costs between the giants and smaller 
companies also played roles in this change may be a topic for future research. 
 
B. Forbes magazine data 
 Though less well known than the Fortune lists, Forbes magazine has been compiling "500" 
lists since 1958.  The Forbes lists are similar to but somewhat different from their better-known 
rival's lists.  First, from the beginning, Forbes did not restrict itself to "industrial" companies but 
covered the entire private sector.  Second, Forbes has annually compiled four "500" lists -- based on 
sales revenue, profits, assets, and stock market value.  In addition, from 1980 onward, Forbes has 
reported the aggregate employment of all of the companies that ranked in the top 500 on at least one 
of its lists. (This total number of companies varies from year to year but is usually in the 770-820 
range.) 
 The Forbes lists thus have the major advantages of broad coverage and year-to-year 
consistency in coverage.31  But they share with the Fortune lists the disadvantage of presenting 
                                                           
    30 And, of course, smaller firms' shares of employment exceeded their shares of payroll in Table 
8. 
    31 By contrast, the Fortune lists have not had employment data consistently available for either 
their largest 500 or their largest 1,000 for any extensive period. 
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consolidated company information, which means that the companies' non-U.S. operations are 
included, and of excluding companies that are not headquartered in the U.S., even if (e.g., Daimler-
Chrysler) they have substantial U.S. operations. 
 For our purposes the advantages out-weigh the disadvantages.  The opportunity to use a data 
set with consistent coverage from 198032 through 2000 for the two major components of corporate 
value added -- profits33 and employment -- is too good to pass up.  The other three series in the 
Forbes lists, however, are too flawed for computations of aggregate concentration.  The drawbacks 
to using sales and assets were discussed above in Section III.  The use of stock market value would 
restrict the universe over which aggregate concentration would be calculated to only the 
(approximately) 10,000 publicly traded companies and thus would miss much of what the 
social/political concern about aggregate concentration is all about. 
 In the first two columns of Table 6 we present the Forbes data on after-tax profits for the 
largest 500 U.S. companies (ranked by profits) in each year and on employment for all of the 
companies that entered the four Forbes lists in that year, along with the number of such companies; 
in the next two columns we present the relevant national aggregates -- total U.S. after-tax corporate 
profits34 and private sector employment; the final two columns present the relevant ratios.  As can 
                                                           
    32 1980 is chosen for the starting date for two reasons.  First, it is the first year for which 
employment data from the Forbes lists are available.  Second, it allows us to pick up where White 
(1981) left off. 
    33 The potential drawbacks to using publicly reported company data on profits, discussed above, 
still remain and seem unavoidable if the profits component of corporate value added is going to 
enter an aggregate concentration measure. 
    34 The IRS Statistics of Income, Corporations publications are the source of these data.  The IRS 
data are compiled from corporate tax returns, which should make them reasonably comparable to 
the company-reported after-tax profits of the Forbes lists.  An alternative source of after-tax 
corporate profits data, the national income accounts, also include inventory valuation and capital 
consumption adjustments.  The IRS data, however, are currently available only through 1998.  To 
estimate the 1999 and 2000 values, I regressed (OLS) the IRS data against the national income data 
for the years 1980-1998, and used that equation and the national income figures for 1999 and 2000 
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be seen, aggregate concentration as measured by the profits of the largest 500 companies generally 
trended downward through 1998, and then rose;35 but the percentage values for 1999 and 2000 
were well below the values of the early 1980s and were in the range of the early 1990s percentages. 
 The employment percentages trended downward through 1995 and then rose;36 the percentage in 
2000 was well below that of the early 1980s and was comparable to those of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
 Thus, the aggregate concentration estimates drawn from the Forbes lists are quite consistent 
with those based on the Census Bureau data:  Aggregate concentration has not increased since the 
late 1980s.  The Forbes data also indicate that aggregate concentration has decreased since the early 
1980s. 
                                                                                                                                                             
to estimate the IRS figures.  That estimating equation is as follows (t-statistics are in parentheses): 
    πIRS  =  -97.19  +  1.45 πNI 
         (2.91)  (14.49)  R2 = 0.93 
    35 The 1982 ratio of greater than 100% is due to the IRS data's showing large numbers of 
companies with losses for that year, so that the aggregate (net) profits for all corporations were 
below the profits of the largest 500 (who were selected by Forbes to be those with the largest profits 
and thus none of whom had losses). 
    36 The varying number of companies from which the Forbes employment aggregate is calculated 
might seem to create an excessive margin for error for the employment calculations.  However, the 
ending-year number of companies (817 companies in 2000) was virtually identical to the 
beginning-year number of companies (818 companies in 1980), which facilitates beginning and 
ending comparisons.  Further, with the exception of the anomalous 895 companies in 1999, the 
number of companies for the remaining year all fell within the range of 774-818 companies.  
Though Forbes does not list the employment levels for each company, Fortune does list company 
employment for its list covering company rankings for 2000.  The 45 companies that spanned 
Fortune's 774-818 rankings in 2000 (based on sales revenue) had a total employment of 448,000.  
This 448,000 constituted only 1.8% of the total employment of 24.9 million for the 817 Forbes 
companies shown in Table 12 for 2000.  Thus, the modestly varying number of companies through 
the years were unlikely to have affected the clear trends shown in that table. 
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 V. Conclusion 
 
A. A summary of the findings. 
 The results of the previous section are clear and strong:  Aggregate concentration in the U.S. 
-- the fraction of private-sector economic activity accounted for by the largest X companies in the 
U.S. -- declined during the 1980s, and declined further in the early 1990s and then increased by the 
late 1990s only to the levels of the late 1980s or early 1990s.  Overall, aggregate concentration has 
clearly not risen since the late 1980s and has declined since the early 1980s, despite the substantial 
merger wave of the 1980s and the far greater merger wave of the 1990s.  Tables 5 and 12 offer 
straightforward evidence of these conclusions. 
 These economy-wide results for the 1980s and 1990s are consistent with the evidence 
described and presented in Section III for the long-term value-added data that are narrowly focused 
on manufacturing (Table 1), for the long-term data describing the assets of non-financial 
corporations (Table 2), and for economy-wide aggregate concentration trends in the 1970s (Table 
3). 
 Though aggregate concentration has not risen, however, the average size of company has 
increased, and the fraction of employment and payroll accounted for by companies in the larger size 
categories has increased.  From Tables 7 and 8, in 1988 there were 6,369 companies in the U.S. 
with 1,000-or-more employees; they constituted 0.013% of all companies, but they employed 
40.4% of all private-sector workers, and they accounted for 46.6% of all private-sector payroll.  A 
decade later, in 1998, there were 8,312 companies with 1,000-or-more employees; they now 
constituted 0.015% of all companies, and they employed 44.0% of all private-sector employees and 
accounted for 49.3% of all private-sector payroll.  As a summary measure of increased skewness 
and inequality in firm sizes, the Gini coefficients for private-sector employment and payroll 
increased modestly but steadily from 1988 through 1998 (Table 9). 
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 Thus, though the giants of the economy have not expanded their shares of economic 
activity, the relative importance of large companies has increased somewhat.  This increase, though 
should be kept in context.  Between 1988 and 1998 the total number of "employer firms" increased 
by over 10%, and the aggregate numbers of companies and of employment and payroll increased in 
all size categories.  Thus, though small companies were declining somewhat in relative importance 
(Table 6), they were far from an endangered species. 
 
B. Some hypotheses about these patterns. 
 The major goal of this article was to lay out the new data on economy-wide aggregate 
concentration.  The rigorous testing of hypotheses to explain these patterns will have to await future 
research. 
 Nevertheless, we can offer some tentative hypotheses that may help guide that future 
research.  We will focus primarily on addressing the question, why hasn't aggregate concentration 
increased? 
 One set of possibilities would focus on the advantages and disadvantages of firm size.  
"Very" large size may be a disadvantage:  The "U"-shape average cost curve (rather than an "L" or 
even a rectangular hyperbola) may be an accurate representation of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of size in a horizontal sense; the net advantages of much vertical integration may be 
overblown; and economies of scope in most areas may be weak.37  CEOs who are empire-minded 
or just excessively optimistic, and who are poorly restrained by weak corporate governance 
procedures, may try constantly to create giant firms through M&As; but economic reality eventually 
intrudes and forces shrinkage and spinoffs. 
                                                           
    37 Of course, industry specifics, technology specifics, and even organization specifics will be 
important determinants of what size (in various dimensions) is efficient and what size is excessively 
large. 
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 Another set of possibilities focuses on the M&A data itself, which may be overstating the 
extent to which the registered transactions automatically imply an increase in corporate size.  First, 
about a third of the transactions that are included in the "M&A" lists are divestitures:38  Company A 
is spinning off a subsidiary.  This subsidiary may be become a stand-alone entity, in which case 
aggregate concentration automatically decreases; or it may be bought by another company, in which 
case aggregate concentration can increase or decrease, depending on the size of the acquiring 
company as compared to the divesting company.  Unfortunately, there are no readily available data 
that would allow further investigation of divestitures. 
 Second, more than a seventh of the M&A totals involve U.S. companies' purchases of non-
U.S. companies.39  If the acquired company has no U.S. activities, this transaction would yield no 
immediate change in aggregate concentration, as measured by the Bureau of the Census data; there 
could be a subsequent decrease in aggregate concentration as measured by these data if the 
combined firm achieved company-wide efficiencies and resource re-allocations that led to a 
decrease in U.S. resources employed.  The transaction would increase aggregate concentration as 
measured by the Forbes lists, however.  Only if the acquired (non-U.S.) company had U.S. 
operations would the acquisition increase aggregate concentration as indicated by both measures. 
 Third, about a tenth of the M&A totals involve non-U.S. companies' purchases of U.S.-
headquartered companies.40  The immediate consequences for the Forbes list has already been 
                                                           
    38 For 1991-2000, the ratio of divestitures to total M&As listed by Mergers & Acquisitions 
magazine was 35.1%; for Mergerstat that percentage was 29.7%. 
    39 For 1991-2000 the ratio of transactions involving a U.S. company's purchase of a non-U.S. 
company to total M&As listed by Mergers & Acquisitions magazine was 15.5%; for Mergerstat the 
ratio was 14.6%.  These percentages and the divestiture percentages are not exclusive of each other 
and contain some overlapping transactions. 
    40 For 1991-2000 the ratio of transactions involving a non-U.S. company purchasing a U.S. 
company to the total M&As listed by Mergers & Acquisitions magazine was 10.4%; for Mergerstat 
the ratio was 8.6%.  Again, these percentages and the divestiture percentages are not exclusive of 
each other. 
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noted:  The acquired company disappears from the list, and the acquiring company does not replace 
it; aggregate concentration automatically decreases.  The effect on the Census Bureau measure is, 
again, more nuanced:  If the acquiring (non-U.S.) company did not have previous U.S. activities, 
aggregate concentration is not immediately affected; if the combined company effects sufficient 
company-wide efficiencies and resource re-allocations so that resources employed by the acquired 
unit in the U.S. decrease, aggregate concentration will subsequently decrease; and if the acquiring 
company already had operations in the U.S., then aggregate concentration increases (although 
subsequent rationalization of the combined U.S. operations may yield an offset). 
 Finally, as was discussed in Section IV, neither the Forbes data nor the Bureau of the 
Census data are perfect, and they may yield misleading calculations of aggregate concentration.  
The Forbes data have all of the imperfections of relying on consolidated company data, so that non-
U.S. operations are included, even in the absence of the complications just discussed of the M&As 
that involved non-U.S. companies during the years covered.  Also, the Forbes after-tax profit data 
are subject to the vagaries of accounting and tax variations.  The Bureau of the Census data 
encompass only employment and payroll and cover only a relatively short period; they do not 
encompass corporate profits, the other important component of value added, and thus cannot 
provide be a more comprehensive measure of aggregate concentration.   Still, this last 
hypothesis -- that the data are misrepresenting the true trends in aggregate concentration -- seems 
the weakest possibility, since there are no apparent biases in these data that would be pushing them 
to understate aggregate concentration. 
 The other noticeable pattern -- the rising relative importance of firms in the larger size 
categories (though not the giants) -- may be due to a number of influences.  First, in some industries 
the importance of sunk costs, such as advertising and promotion, may be growing, and, as a 
consequence, the relative advantages of larger firms may be growing as well; also, as Kwoka and 
White (2001) argue (following Sutton (1991)), the rising importance of sunk costs may be 
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endogenous -- the result of the decisions of the leading firms in those industries. 
 Second, the rising importance of exports for the U.S. economy has likely had a positive 
influence on firm size, since the development and maintenance of overseas markets involve sunk 
costs and thus scale. 
 Third, improved technologies of managing and monitoring may have helped overcome the 
inherent difficulties of managing larger organizations (Williamson 1967) and thus encouraged 
larger enterprises. 
 Finally, the changing weights of the major sectors of the economy -- especially the 
expanding importance of services and the shrinking relative importance of manufacturing (Tables 
10 and 11) -- also played a role, since the relative importance of large firms in manufacturing was 
shrinking while the relative importance of large firms in services was growing. 
 Overall, the findings of this study, as well of previous studies, that aggregate concentration 
in the U.S. economy has not been increasing, despite recent merger waves, may appear as 
somewhat of a surprise.  But there are potential plausible hypotheses to explain these results.  
Further research, while refining these aggregate concentration measures, may also be able to shed 
further light on the possible explanations for their pattern. 
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 Appendix 
 
 The M&A series published by Mergerstat pertain to "announcements".  The series for the 
annual number of mergers begins in 1963; the series for the annual value of mergers begins in 
1968.41  Mergerstat describes its minimum transaction size criteria (for inclusion in their series, as 
of 2001) as follows: "Mergerstat tracks formal transfers of ownership of at least 10% of a 
company's equity where the purchase price is at least $1,000,000 and where at least one of the 
parties is a U.S. entity."  These criteria were adopted in 1989.  Prior to that year the minimum 
purchase price was $500,000.  Unfortunately, Mergerstat made no adjustment to its historical data 
when the new criteria were adopted, so the pre-1988 data are (for our purposes) upward biased. 
 The M&A series published by Mergers & Acquisitions pertain to "completions".  The series 
for the annual number of M&As begins in 1967, and the series for the annual value of M&As 
begins in 1979.42  Mergers & Acquisitions describes its minimum transaction size criteria (for 
inclusion in the series, as of 2001) as "all completed mergers, acquisition, and divestitures priced at 
$5 million and over, as well as purchases of partial interest that involve at least a 40% stake in the 
target company or an investment of at least $100."  Also, the transactions must have an American 
company on at least one side of the transaction.  These criteria were adopted in 1991; prior to that 
year, from the fourth quarter of 1980 through 1990 the criteria were "a transaction must involve a 
U.S. company and must be valued at $1 million or more.  Partial acquisitions of %5 or more of a 
company's capital stock are included if the payments are $1 million or more."  And before the 
fourth quarter of 1980 the minimum criterion was $700,000. 
 The 1991 criteria were applied by M&A to its historical data back to 1982; unfortunately, 
                                                           
    41 Prior to 1988 this series was published by W.T. Grimm & Co. 
    42 This is the same series that has been compiled and released by the Securities Data Co., now 
Thomson Financial Securities Data Co. 
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no historical data adjustments were made at the time of the 1980 change.  In order to adjust M&A's 
number of mergers for 1981 and earlier years to the 1991-and-after criteria, I used the ratio of 
M&A's post-adjustment number of mergers for 1982 to M&A's pre-adjustment number of mergers 
for 1982 as a multiplicand.  A similar procedure was used to adjust M&A's value of mergers for 
1979-1981. 
 Since both sources use a fixed minimum purchase price criterion, their series will tend to 
show an upward bias over time in an inflationary era. 
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Figure 1: Annual Number of Large Mergers, 
1963-2000
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Figure 2: Annual Value of Large Mergers, 1968-
2000 ($billions)
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Figure 3: Annual Number of Large Mergers 
Divided by Real GDP, 1963-2000 (Index 
numbers: 1980 = 100)
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Figure 4: Annual Number of Large Mergers Divided by Number 
of Corporations, 1963-2000 (Index numbers: 1980 = 100)
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Figure 5: Annual Value of Large Mergers Deflated by GDP 
Deflator, 1968-2000 (Index numbers: 1980 = 100)
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Figure 6: Annual Value of Large Mergers Divided by Nominal 
GDP, 1968-2000 (Index numbers: 1980 = 100)
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Figure 7: Annual Value of Large Mergers Divided by Aggregate 
Stock Market Value, 1968-2000 (Index numbers: 1980 = 100)
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Table 1: Aggregate Concentration in Manufacturing, as Measured by Value Added, 
1947-1997 
 
 Share of Total Value Added in Manufacturing Sector 
Year Largest 50 Cos. Largest 100 Cos. Largest 150 Cos. Largest 200 Cos. 
1947 17% 23% 27% 30% 
1954 23 30 34 37 
1958 23 30 35 38 
1962* 24 32 36 35 
1963 25 33 37 41 
1966* 25 33 38 42 
1967 25 33 38 42 
1970* 24 33 38 43 
1972 25 33 39 43 
1976* 24 33 39 44 
1977 24 33 39 44 
1982 25 33 39 43 
1987 25 33 39 43 
1992 24 32 38 42 
1997 24 32 37 40 
 
Note: Data are for economic census years, except for years with a (*), which draw on 
the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, various years; Survey of 
Manufactures, various years. 
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Table 2: Aggregate Concentration in the Non-Financial Private Sector, as Measured by 
Assets, 1958-1988 
 
 Share of Total Assets of Non-Financial Private Sector 
Year Largest 50 Cos. Largest 100 Cos. Largest 150 Cos. Largest 200 Cos. 
1958 23.9% 31.6% 36.5% 40.0% 
1963 24.2 31.3 36.3 39.9 
1967 24.5 31.9 37.1 41.0 
1972 23.2 30.5 35.7 39.7 
1974 23.2 30.4 35.5 39.2 
1975 23.3 30.6 35.6 39.5 
1976 23.3 30.4 35.3 39.1 
1977 22.7 29.7 34.5 38.3 
1978 22.3 29.2 34.0 37.7 
1979 21.9 28.9 33.7 37.4 
1980 22.4 29.4 34.0 37.7 
1981 22.2 28.8 33.3 36.9 
1982 21.4 27.7 32.1 35.4 
1983 21.0 27.3 31.6 34.9 
1984 19.7 26.4 30.7 33.9 
1985 19.3 25.8 29.1 32.8 
1986 18.6 25.1 29.9 32.2 
1987 18.6 25.1 29.1 32.1 
1988 18.7 25.1 29.2 32.2 
 
Source: Yellen (1998). 
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Table 3: Aggregate Concentration in the Entire Private Sector, as Measured by 
Employment and by Profits, 1972-1980 
 
 
 
Share of Total Non-Farm Private 
Sector Employment 
Share of Total Corporate Profits after 
Taxes 
 
Year 
Largest 
100 Cos. 
Largest 
200 Cos. 
Largest 
1,300 Cos. 
Largest 
100 Cos. 
Largest 
200 Cos. 
Largest 
1,300 Cos. 
1972 18.2% 23.9% 37.3% 43.3% 55.4% 76.6% 
1973 n.a n.a. 37.4 n.a. n.a. 75.1 
1974 n.a. n.a. 37.0 n.a. n.a. 72.6 
1975 n.a. n.a. 36.5 n.a. n.a. 71.4 
1976 n.a. n.a. 36.1 n.a. n.a. 73.8 
1977 17.3 22.7 35.5 39.8 50.2 71.4 
1978 n.a. n.a. 34.7 n.a. n.a. 70.4 
1979 16.7 22.6 34.2 39.4 49.9 71.1 
1980 16.6 22.1 34.0 44.9 56.5 75.6 
 
Sources: White (1981); Golbe and White (1986). 
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Table 4: Economy-Wide Numbers, Employment, and Payrolls of Companies, 1988-
1998 
  
 
 
 
Year 
Aggregate  
Number of 
Companies 
(thousand) 
 
Aggregate 
Employment 
(thousand) 
 
Aggregate  
Payroll 
(billion) 
 
Average 
Employment 
Per Company 
Average 
Payroll 
Per Company 
(thousand) 
1988 4,955 87,844 $1,859 17.7 $375.2 
1989 5,021 91,626 1,990 18.2 396.3 
1990 5,073 93,469 2,104 18.4 414.7 
1991 5,051 92,308 2,145 18.3 424.7 
1992 5,095 92,828 2,272 18.2 445.9 
1993 5,194 94,774 2,363 18.2 454.9 
1994 5,277 96,722 2,488 18.3 471.5 
1995 5,369 100,315 2,666 18.7 496.6 
1996 5,478 102,187 2,849 18.7 520.1 
1997 5,542 105,299 3,048 19.0 550.0 
1998 5,579 108,118 3,309 19.4 593.1 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Statistics of U.S. Busines” 
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Table 5: Aggregate Concentration in the Entire Private Sector, as Measured by 
Employment and Payroll, 1988-1998 
 
Year 
Largest 
100 Cos. 
Largest 
500 Cos. 
Largest 
1,000 Cos. 
Panel A: Share of Total Private-Sector Employment 
1988 11.3% 21.9% 27.1% 
1989  11.1 21.5 26.6 
1990  11.0 21.4 26.6 
1991  11.1 21.6 26.8 
1992  10.9 21.3 26.6 
1993 10.7 20.8 26.1 
1994 10.6 20.7 26.1 
1995 10.5 20.7 26.1 
1996 10.6 20.9 26.5 
1997 10.9 21.2 26.7 
1998 10.8 21.5 27.1 
Panel B: Share of Total Private-Sector Payroll 
1988 13.8% 26.3% 32.4% 
1989  13.6 25.6 31.2 
1990  13.2 25.3 31.5 
1991  13.2 25.4 31.6 
1992  12.9 24.9 31.3 
1993 12.0 24.1 30.5 
1994 11.8 23.6 29.9 
1995 11.7 23.6 29.8 
1996 11.2 23.3 30.0 
1997 11.4 23.4 30.0 
1998 10.9 23.4 30.5 
 
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census 
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Table 6:  Share of Private-Sector Employment and Payroll Accounted for by Small 
Firms, 1988-1998 
 
Share of Total Private-Sector 
Employment 
Share of Total Private-Sector 
Payroll 
 
 
Year 
Firms with 
Fewer than 100 
Employees 
Firms with 
Fewer than 500 
Employees 
Firms with 
Fewer than 100 
Employees 
Firms with 
Fewer than 500 
Employees 
1988 40.0% 54.5% 35.4% 48.6% 
1989 39.3 53.9 34.7 47.9 
1990 39.2 53.7 34.6 47.9 
1991 38.9 53.1 34.2 47.2 
1992 38.7 53.0 33.8 47.0 
1993 38.5 53.1 33.9 47.2 
1994 38.1 52.7 33.8 47.3 
1995 37.9 52.5 33.4 47.0 
1996 37.7 52.0 33.2 46.7 
1997 37.3 51.8 32.7 46.5 
1998 36.7 50.9 32.2 45.7 
 
Source: Kwoka and White (2001); Bureau of the Census 
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Table 7: Numbers and Percentage Distribution of Companies, by Employment Size, 1988-1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Total 
 
 
1-4 Empl.  
 
 
5-9 Empl. 
 
10-19 
Empl. 
 
20-99 
Empl. 
 
100-499 
Empl. 
 
500-999 
Empl. 
1,000- 
1,499 
Empl. 
1,500- 
2,499 
Empl. 
2,500- 
4,999 
Empl. 
5,000- 
9,999 
Empl. 
 
10,000+ 
Empl. 
Panel A: Number of Companies 
1988 4,954,645 2,979,905 923,580 540,988 430,640 66,708 6455 2142 1737 1216 631 643 
1989 5,021,315 3,003,224 937,202 553,449 443,959 69,608 6926 2361 1913 1331 678 664 
1990 5,073,795 3,020,935 952,030 562,610 453,732 70,465 6948 2365 1965 1336 703 706 
1991 5,051,025 3,036,304 941,296 551,299 439,811 68,338 6842 2379 1983 1365 709 699 
1992 5,095,356 3,075,280 945,802 551,912 439,084 69,156 6892 2383 1986 1434 723 704 
1993 5,193,642 3,139,518 962,481 559,602 445,900 71,512 7185 2437 2080 1478 726 723 
1994 5,276,964 3,208,235 964,985 563,097 452,383 73,267 7415 2451 2089 1553 726 763 
1995 5,369,068 3,249,573 981,094 576,866 469,869 76,222 7566 2592 2110 1632 768 776 
1996 5,478,047 3,327,783 996,356 585,844 476,312 76,136 7670 2632 2117 1580 796 821 
1997 5,541,918 3,358,048 1,006,897 593,696 487,491 79,707 7972 2659 2132 1673 818 825 
1998 5,579,177 3,376,351 1,011,849 600,167 494,357 80,075 8055 2714 2200 1654 869 886 
Panel B: Percentage Distribution of Companies 
1988 100.0% 60.14% 18.64% 10.92% 8.69% 1.35% 0.130% 0.043% 0.035% 0.025% 0.013% 0.013% 
1989 100.0 59.81 18.66 11.02 8.84 1.39 0.138 0.047 0.038 0.027 0.014 0.013 
1990 100.0 59.54 18.76 11.09 8.94 1.39 0.137 0.047 0.039 0.026 0.014 0.014 
1991 100.0 60.11 18.64 10.91 8.71 1.35 0.135 0.047 0.039 0.027 0.014 0.014 
1992 100.0 60.35 18.56 10.83 8.62 1.36 0.135 0.047 0.039 0.028 0.014 0.014 
1993 100.0 60.45 18.53 10.77 8.59 1.38 0.138 0.047 0.040 0.028 0.014 0.014 
1994 100.0 60.80 18.29 10.67 8.57 1.39 0.141 0.046 0.040 0.029 0.014 0.014 
1995 100.0 60.52 18.27 10.74 8.75 1.42 0.141 0.048 0.039 0.030 0.014 0.014 
1996 100.0 60.75 18.19 10.69 8.69 1.39 0.140 0.048 0.039 0.029 0.015 0.015 
1997 100.0 60.59 18.17 10.71 8.80 1.44 0.144 0.048 0.038 0.030 0.015 0.015 
1998 100.0 60.52 18.14 10.76 8.86 1.44 0.144 0.049 0.039 0.030 0.016 0.016 
 
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census 
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Table 8: Percentage Distribution of Private-Sector Employment and Payroll, by Employment Size of Company, 1988-1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Total 
 
1-4 
Empl.  
 
5-9 
Empl. 
 
10-19 
Empl. 
 
20-99 
Empl. 
100-
499 
Empl. 
500-
999 
Empl. 
1,000- 
1,499 
Empl. 
1,500- 
2,499 
Empl. 
2,500- 
4,999 
Empl. 
5,000- 
9,999 
Empl. 
 
10,000+ 
Empl. 
Panel A: Percentage Distribution of Employment 
1988 100.0% 5.70% 6.90% 8.26% 19.16% 14.53% 5.07% 2.97% 3.78% 4.80% 5.03% 23.81% 
1989 100.0 5.52 6.71 8.10 18.94 14.60 5.22 3.14 4.01 5.01 5.18 23.58 
1990 100.0 5.47 6.69 8.07 18.95 14.49 5.14 3.08 4.02 4.92 5.21 23.95 
1991 100.0 5.58 6.69 8.00 18.58 14.24 5.11 3.15 4.11 5.10 5.34 24.11 
1992 100.0 5.58 6.68 7.96 18.44 14.34 5.11 3.13 4.08 5.32 5.42 23.93 
1993 100.0 5.55 6.66 7.91 18.38 14.59 5.23 3.15 4.18 5.42 5.33 23.60 
1994 100.0 5.50 6.55 7.80 18.29 14.60 5.30 3.09 4.14 5.54 5.19 24.00 
1995 100.0 5.38 6.42 7.71 18.36 14.61 5.21 3.16 4.04 5.65 5.35 24.10 
1996 100.0 5.37 6.40 7.69 18.24 14.34 5.18 3.13 3.98 5.40 5.39 24.88 
1997 100.0 5.27 6.28 7.56 18.15 14.55 5.22 3.07 3.87 5.49 5.41 25.15 
1998 100.0 5.17 6.14 7.44 17.92 14.25 5.13 3.06 3.90 5.29 5.63 26.07 
Panel B: Percentage Distribution of Payroll 
1988 100.0% 5.85% 5.54% 7.01% 16.99% 13.16% 4.83% 2.95% 3.95% 5.27% 5.88% 28.55% 
1989 100.0 5.65 5.43 6.87 16.72 13.27 4.99 3.17 4.21 5.58 6.00 28.10 
1990 100.0 5.55 5.42 6.87 16.75 13.28 4.90 3.10 4.22 5.39 6.12 28.40 
1991 100.0 5.51 5.44 6.83 16.41 13.03 4.99 3.19 4.34 5.60 6.28 28.37 
1992 100.0 5.48 5.39 6.73 16.24 13.12 5.02 3.21 4.34 6.03 6.43 28.01 
1993 100.0 5.46 5.38 6.73 16.29 13.38 5.13 3.22 4.49 6.06 6.47 27.38 
1994 100.0 5.41 5.29 6.69 16.40 13.49 5.18 3.16 4.39 6.30 6.23 27.45 
1995 100.0 5.31 5.14 6.58 16.39 13.54 5.13 3.23 4.27 6.49 6.45 27.47 
1996 100.0 5.29 5.08 6.51 16.33 13.48 5.13 3.21 4.19 6.24 6.53 28.01 
1997 100.0 5.20 4.95 6.36 16.23 13.73 5.13 3.24 4.15 6.27 6.68 28.06 
1998 100.0 5.09 4.83 6.26 16.05 13.49 5.04 3.15 4.12 5.98 6.72 29.29 
 
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census
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Table 9: Gini Coefficients for Private-Sector Employment and Payroll, Relative to Numbers of 
Companies, 1988-1998 
 
 
 
Year 
Gini 
Coefficient for 
Employment 
Gini 
Coefficient 
for Payroll 
1988 0.8262 0.8391 
1989 0.8290 0.8419 
1990 0.8290 0.8425 
1991 0.8304 0.8454 
1992 0.8314 0.8474 
1993 0.8323 0.8477 
1994 0.8347 0.8493 
1995 0.8359 0.8508 
1996 0.8372 0.8524 
1997 0.8388 0.8542 
1998 0.8414 0.8567 
 
Source: Computed by author, from data in Tables 7 and 8
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Table 10: Aggregate Concentration within Major Industry Sectors, as Measured by Share of Private-Sector Employment in Companies with More 
than 10,000 Employees, 1988-1998 
 
Year  Mining Constr. Manuf. 
Trans., 
Comm., Util. Wholesale Retail Fin. & R.E. Services Other 
1988 # of cos. 9 4 210 65 21 124 78 120 2 
 empl. % 17.2% 1.5% 31.4% 41.3% 6.8% 28.1% 24.8% 10.4% n.a. 
1989 # of cos. 9 5 207 60 22 138 82 136 1 
 empl. % 18.1% 1.7% 30.9% 48.0% 7.0% 28.6% 26.1% 10.9% n.a. 
1990 # of cos. 9 4 208 64 24 146 79 151 1 
 empl. % 17.5% 1.7% 30.6% 40.7% 7.4% 29.3% 26.4% 11.5% n.a. 
1991 # of cos. 6 5 212 57 24 146 77 165 1 
 empl. % 12.7% 2.1% 30.7% 40.6% 7.7% 29.6% 27.4% 12.0% n.a. 
1992 # of cos. 7 4 204 56 22 151 67 172 2 
 empl. % 13.8% 1.9% 29.6% 39.8% 7.5% 30.3% 26.5% 12.2% n.a. 
1993 # of cos. 3 5 200 59 25 156 71 190 1 
 empl. % 5.4% 1.9% 28.4% 39.8% 7.6% 30.8% 26.6% 12.8% n.a. 
1994 # of cos. 3 4 194 62 25 163 76 201 1 
 empl. % 5.2% 1.5% 27.4% 39.5% 7.4% 31.7% 27.9% 13.5% n.a. 
1995 # of cos. 2 3 200 58 25 169 75 205 2 
 empl. % n.a. 1.2% 26.8% 38.7% 7.1% 32.3% 28.5% 14.4% n.a. 
1996 # of cos. 1 2 199 63 26 171 80 230 2 
 empl. % n.a. .n.a. 26.4% 40.1% 7.2% 33.0% 30.4% 15.9% n.a. 
1997 # of cos. 2 2 195 63 27 167 89 248 2 
 empl. % n.a. n.a. 25.7% 39.9% 7.7% 33.7% 32.4% 16.9% n.a. 
1998* # of cos. 2 3 154 77 20 117 92 328 0 
 empl. % n.a. 0.9% 22.4% 36.9% 6.6% 39.5% 32.0% 16.5% 0 
1988 
 
% of all priv. 
sec. empl. 0.8% 5.7% 21.9% 6.0% 6.8% 21.5% 7.6% 28.7% 0.9% 
1997 
 
% of all priv. 
sec. empl. 0.6% 5.2% 17.7% 5.9% 6.5% 20.9% 7.0% 35.5% 0.7% 
*Because of the change from the SIC to NAICS industrial classification system in 1998, the 1998 data are not strictly comparable to earlier years, 
especially for “transportation, communications, and utilities” and for “services”.  
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census. 
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Table 11: Aggregate Concentration within Major Industry Sectors, as Measured by Share of Private-Sector Payroll in Companies with More than 
10,000 Employees, 1988-1998 
 
Year  Mining Constr. Manuf. 
Trans., 
Comm., Util. Wholesale Retail Fin. & R.E. Services Other 
1988 # of cos. 9 4 210 65 21 124 78 120 2 
 payroll % 22.1% 1.9% 39.4% 49.7% 9.5% 27.4% 27.6% 9.9% n.a. 
1989 # of cos. 9 5 207 60 22 138 82 136 1 
 payroll % 22.5% 2.3% 39.2% 48.0% 10.1% 28.4% 29.3% 10.6% n.a. 
1990 # of cos. 9 4 208 64 24 146 79 151 1 
 payroll % 21.9% 2.2% 38.5% 48.8% 9.8% 29.3% 30.1% 11.4% n.a. 
1991 # of cos. 6 5 212 57 24 146 77 165 1 
 payroll % 15.4% 2.6% 38.7% 47.7% 10.0% 29.6% 30.9% 12.0% n.a. 
1992 # of cos. 7 4 204 56 22 151 67 172 2 
 payroll % 17.9% 2.4% 37.2% 46.9% 9.6% 30.8% 29.3% 12.3% n.a. 
1993 # of cos. 3 5 200 59 25 156 71 190 1 
 payroll % 6.5% 2.2% 36.0% 47.1% 9.8% 31.1% 29.0% 13.1% n.a. 
1994 # of cos. 3 4 194 62 25 163 76 201 1 
 payroll % 6.1% 1.6% 34.9% 46.7% 8.9% 31.6% 30.6% 13.6% n.a. 
1995 # of cos. 2 3 200 58 25 169 75 205 2 
 payroll % n.a 1.3% 34.1% 46.0% 8.5% 32.5% 31.2% 14.6% n.a. 
1996 # of cos. 1 2 199 63 26 171 80 230 2 
 payroll % n.a n.a. 33.5% 46.5% 8.3% 33.0% 32.8% 16.2% n.a. 
1997 # of cos. 2 2 195 63 27 167 89 248 2 
 payroll % n.a n.a. 32.8% 46.3% 8.7% 33.1% 35.0% 17.1% n.a. 
1998* # of cos. 2 3 154 77 20 117 92 328 0 
 payroll % n.a. 0.8% 27.7% 37.1% 7.5% 32.1% 35.0% 21.4% 0 
1988 
 
% of all priv. 
sec. empl. 0.8% 5.7% 21.9% 6.0% 6.8% 21.5% 7.6% 28.7% 0.9% 
1997 
 
% of all priv. 
sec. empl. 0.6% 5.2% 17.7% 5.9% 6.5% 20.9% 7.0% 35.5% 0.7% 
* Because of the change from the SIC to NAICS industrial classification system in 1998, the 1998 industry sector data are not strictly comparable 
to earlier years, especially for “transportation, communications, and utilities” and for “services”.  
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census
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Table 12: Aggregate Concentration in the Entire Private Sector, as Measured by Corporate Profits and by Employment, 1980-2000 
 
 Forbes Data Private Sector Totals Large Co. Shares of Totals 
 
 
Year 
Profits, Largest 
500 Cos. 
($ billion) 
Employment 
(million); No. 
of Cos. 
 
Corp. Profits 
($ billion) 
 
Employment
(million) 
 
 
Profits 
 
 
Employment 
1980 $119 22.6  (818) $167 74.2 71.3% 21.2% 
1981 124 22.4  (798) 157 75.2 79.0 20.9 
1982 112 21.6  (808) 109 73.7 102.8 20.5 
1983 132 21.9  (808) 136 74.3 97.1 20.7 
1984 140 21.2  (785) 171 78.4 81.9 19.2 
1985 133 21.1  (798) 179 81.0 74.3 18.5 
1986 141 20.6  (790) 198 82.7 71.2 17.8 
1987 156 20.5  (796) 244 84.9 63.9 17.2 
1988 167 19.9  (778) 321 87.8 52.0 16.2 
1989  182 20.3  (783) 293 90.1 62.1 16.2 
1990  171 20.6  (776) 275 91.1 62.2 16.1 
1991  155 20.8  (790) 252 89.8 61.5 16.4 
1992  179 20.4  (774) 300 90.0 59.7 16.0 
1993 204 20.2  (785) 375 91.9 54.4 15.6 
1994 250 20.2  (776) 441 95.0 56.7 15.2 
1995 285 20.4  (787) 558 97.9 51.1 14.9 
1996 325 20.9  (785) 635 100.2 51.2 15.0 
1997 356 21.9  (779) 731 103.1 48.7 15.4 
1998 364 22.9  (799) 909 106.0 40.0 15.7 
1999  451 23.9  (895) 773* 108.6 58.3 16.0 
2000 496 24.9  (817) 870* 111.1 57.0 16.3 
 
* Estimated; see text. 
 
Sources: Forbes magazine; IRS; BLS. 
 
